“How (Not) to Integrate Blood Subtyping Technology to Kidney Exchange,” (joint with Utku Ünver and Özgür Yilmaz), Journal of Economic Theory, 176: 193-231, July 2018. [ Abstract ] [ PDF ]
Category Archives: Refereed Journal Publications
Market Design for Living-Donor Organ Exchanges
Dual-Donor Organ Exchange
“Dual-Donor Organ Exchange,” (joint with Haluk Ergin and Utku Ünver), Econometrica 85(5): 1645-1671, September 2017. [ Abstract ] [ PDF ] [ Supplemental Appendix ] [ Press Coverage ].
School choice under complete information: An experimental study
“School Choice Under Complete Information: An Experimental Study,” (joint with Yan Chen and Yingzhi Liang), Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 1(1): 45-82, December 2016.
Matching with Slot-Specific Priorities: Theory
“Matching with Slot-Specific Priorities: Theory,” (joint with Scott Duke Kominers), Theoretical Economics, 11(2), 683-710, May 2016. [ Abstract ] [ PDF ]
Kidney Exchange and the Alliance for Paired Donation: Operations Research Changes the Way Kidneys Are Transplanted
“Kidney Exchange and the Alliance for Paired Donation: Operations Research Changes the Way Kidneys Are Transplanted,” (joint with Ross Anderson, Itai Ashlagi, David Gamarnik, Michael Rees, Alvin Roth and Utku Unver), INFORMS Journal on Applied Analytics, 45-1: 26-42, January-February 2015. [ Informs link ]
Altruistically Unbalanced Kidney Exchange
“Matching with Contracts: Comment”
“Matching with Contracts: Comment.” (joint with with Orhan Aygün), American Economic Review, 103(5): 2050-2051, August 2013. [ Abstract ] [ PDF ] [ Detailed Working Paper ]
“Matching with (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy”
“Matching with (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy.” (joint with Tobias Switzer), Econometrica, 81(2): 451-488, March 2013. [ PDF ] [ Policy Impact ] [ Media ]
School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation
“School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation.” (joint with Parag Pathak), American Economic Review, 103(1): 80-106, February 2013. [ Abstract ] [ PDF ] [ Appendix ] Corrigendum for Proposition 3