“Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores.” Econometrica 67: 677-689, May 1999. [ PDF ]
Category Archives: Refereed Journal Publications
“Can Pre-Arranged Matches be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets?”
A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement
“A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement.” (joint with Michel Balinski), Journal of Economic Theory, 84: 73-94, January 1999. [ Abstract ] [ PDF ] [ Policy Impact ]
“Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems”
“Manipulation via Capacities in Two-Sided Matching Markets,”
“Games of Manipulation in Marriage Problems”
“Implementation of College Admission Rules”
“Implementation in Generalized Matching Problems,”
“Strategy-Proofness in Many-to-One Matching Problems,”
“Strategy-Proofness in Many-to-One Matching Problems.” Economic Design 1: 365-380, 1996.
