

Kidney Exchange: Past, Present, and Potential Future

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Lund University, School of Economics and Management

Kidney Transplants

- There are close to 96,000 patients on the waiting list for deceased donor kidneys in the U.S. as of April 2013.
- The shortage of kidney increases by about 3,500 kidneys each year in the U.S.




Kidney Transplants

- In 2012:
 - 34,840 patients were added to waiting list while 28,437 patients were removed;
 - 10,868 transplants of deceased donor kidneys performed; and
 - 4,185 patients died while on the waiting list and 2,667 were removed from the list due to being too sick to receive a transplant.
 - There were also 5,619 transplants of kidneys from **living** donors.
- Often living donors are **incompatible** with their intended patient.

Medical Constraint: ABO Blood Type Compatibility

- There are four blood types: A, B, AB and O.




- In the absence of other complications:
 - Type O kidneys can be transplanted into any patient;
 - type A kidneys can be transplanted into type A or type AB patients;
 - type B kidneys can be transplanted into type B or type AB patients;
 - type AB kidneys can only be transplanted into type AB patients.
- Type O patients are disadvantaged because of this “natural injustice.”

Medical Constraint: Tissue Type Compatibility

- Tissue type or **Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA)** type: Combination of several pairs of antigens on Chromosome 6.

HLA proteins A, B, and DR are especially important.



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
- Prior to transplantation, the potential recipient is tested for the presence of preformed antibodies against donor HLA.
If there is a **positive crossmatch**, the transplantation cannot be carried out.

Institutional Constraint: No Money

- The 1984 National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) makes paying for an organ for transplantation a felony:
“it shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation.”

Allocation of Deceased Donor Kidneys in the U.S.

- U.S. Congress views deceased donor kidneys offered for transplantation as a national resource, and the 1984 NOTA established the [Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network \(OPTN\)](#).




- [United Network for Organ Sharing \(UNOS\)](#), as the OPTN contractor, overseas the allocation of deceased donor kidneys.

Live Donor Transplants: Much Less Organized Until 2004

- A patient identifies a willing donor and, if the transplant is feasible, it is carried out.
- Otherwise, the patient remains on the deceased donor queue, while the donor returns home.
- In the period 2000-2004, additional possibilities have been utilized in a few cases through exchanges between two incompatible pairs.

Paired Kidney Exchange



- First proposed by Rapaport (1986).
- The first kidney exchanges were carried out in South Korea in early 1990s.
- Renewed interest in the U.S. with Ross et al. (1997) on “Ethics of Kidney Exchange.”


Paired Kidney Exchange

- In 2000 the transplantation community issued a **consensus statement** declaring it as “ethically acceptable.”
- The consensus statement urged all four operations to be carried out **simultaneously!**
- The first kidney exchange in the U.S. was carried out in Rhode Island in 2000.
- Prior to formal organized kidney exchange clearinghouses, very rare: 5 paired exchanges in New England between 2000-2004.

Kidney Exchange as a Market Design Problem


- The emerging field of **Market Design** applies insights and tools from economic theory to solve real-life resource allocation problems.
- In early 2000s, market designers observed that the two main types of kidney exchanges conducted in the U.S. correspond to the most basic forms of exchanges in **house allocation** models in matching literature.
- Building on the existing practices in kidney transplantation, Roth, Sönmez, & Ünver (2004, 2005, 2007) analyzed how an **efficient** and **incentive-compatible** system of exchanges might be organized, and what its welfare implications might be.
- The methodology and techniques advocated in this research program provided the backbone of several kidney exchange programs in the U.S. and the rest of the world.

Organized Exchange & Optimization is Important



- Even in the absence of more elaborate exchanges, merely organizing the paired-exchanges may result in increased efficiency.


Optimization is Important



Suboptimal Exchange:
2 patients receive transplant

- Even in the absence of more elaborate exchanges, merely organizing the paired-exchanges may result in increased efficiency.


Optimization is Important



Optimal Exchange:
4 patients receive transplant

- Even in the absence of more elaborate exchanges, merely organizing the paired-exchanges may result in increased efficiency.

Gains from Larger Exchanges are Considerable



- Additional live-donor transplants may be possible through three-way, four-way, . . . , exchanges.
- **Three-way exchange** is especially important!

Gifts of Altruistic Donors Can Be Multiplied via Chains



- Simultaneity is not critical when a kidney-chain starts with a donation from an altruistic donor. Hence large kidney-chains can be utilized!

Inclusion of Compatible Pairs is Important

- Typically a blood-type compatible pair participates in kidney exchange only when the donor is tissue-type incompatible with the intended recipient (a.k.a. **positive crossmatch**).
- This is a relatively rare event: Zenios, Woodle & Ross (2001) reports the positive crossmatch frequency as
 - 33.3 % between female patients and their husbands, and
 - 11.1 % between other types of pairs.
- In contrast, a blood-type incompatible pair is automatically referred to a kidney exchange program.
- Hence there are many more blood-type incompatible pairs in kidney exchange programs than blood-type compatible pairs!
$$\implies \quad \# \text{ O Patients} \gg \# \text{ O Donors}$$
- This disparity can be minimized if compatible pairs can also be included in kidney exchange.

There are “Economies of Scale” in Kidney Exchange

- Larger kidney exchange programs (such as national programs) provide a more efficient system than several smaller ones.
- Larger programs are especially beneficial for hard to match patients such as those who have positive crossmatch with a large fraction of donor population (a.k.a. **high PRA** or **highly sensitized** patients).

Number of Kidney Exchanges




Figure from Massie et al AJT 2013

- A handful of kidney exchanges in the U.S. prior to 2004, increased to 93 in 2006 and to 553 in 2010.
- Currently kidney exchanges in the U.S. account for about 10% of all live donor kidney transplants.

The Progress of Kidney Exchange in the Last Decade

- ① Organization & Optimization of Kidney Exchange
- ② Utilizing Gains from Larger Exchanges
- ③ Integration of Altruistic Donors via Kidney Chains
- ④ Inclusion of Compatible Pairs for Increased Efficiency
- ⑤ Higher Efficiency via Larger Kidney Exchange Programs

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To what extent these insights have been utilized so far?

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Incredible 3-way kidney swap



Mike and Susan Williams of Banton

By DAVID GRAHAM
Published on Friday 5 August 2011 14:00

TOP STORIES
[Tower strategy aims](#)

Massive transplant effort pairs 13 kidneys to 13 patients

By Val Willingham, CNN
December 14, 2009 8:40 a.m. EST



Washington (CNN) -- Renee Patterson's most precious present this Christmas won't be under her tree, and it didn't come from a store. This holiday, she said, she got her life back.

The Upper Marlboro, Maryland, resident learned nine years ago she had kidney disease. One of her kidneys began to deteriorate, and she had to begin regular dialysis. Because she couldn't find a family match, her former colleague and friend, Michael Williams, offered to donate one of his kidneys. Problem was, Patterson and

Williams didn't match either. But Patterson's doctor suggested they look into the paired kidney donation program at Washington Hospital Center in Washington, D.C.

She became part a massive mix-and-match transplant effort in the U.S., involving more than a dozen kidneys.

STORY HIGHLIGHTS

- **NEW:** Renee Patterson met her donor, Leslie Wolfe, on Monday
- Patterson joined program that connects patients with willing donors
- Patterson's friend donated kidney to connect the recipient

DENVER AND THE WEST

Selflessness, to the third power

3 kidney transplants to occur simultaneously across country

By Brian Malnes
The Denver Post

POSTED: 07/30/2008 12:30:00 AM MDT

PRINT EMAIL
COMMENTS

With clocks synchronized, three kidney transplants will happen simultaneously at three hospitals in three time zones around the country this morning.

At 7:30 a.m. Denver time, the three-state kidney exchange will begin with patients in North Carolina, in Alabama and at the University of Colorado Hospital in Aurora.

"It's the first time in U.S. history that three transplants will be happening at the same time," said Vonnie Bagwell, the living donor coordinator at CU Denver Health Center.



Maggie Mrva, foreground, is to receive a kidney today from Martha Hansen, rear, at the CU Hospital in Aurora. All three transplant operations are to begin at 7:30 a.m. Denver time. (Brian Lehmann, Pool)

World's Largest Kidney Exchange Gives 14 People New Chance at Life

abc **WORLD NEWS**
WITH GUANIE SANCHEZ

By LISA STARK (@LisaStark) and BRADLEY BLACKBURN
June 15, 2010



In the nation's capital, a circle of strangers is now connected for life.

Beginning last month, 14 donors gave their kidneys to 14 people who desperately needed them in the largest kidney exchange in history.

Washington kidney exchange is largest ever

By Melanie D.G. Kaplan | December 1, 2009, 4:00 AM PST

The largest-ever single-city kidney exchange took place this summer in Washington. The seven-way exchange, which involved 14 patients, occurred at **Georgetown University Hospital** and **Washington Hospital Center** over four days in July. It was the brainchild of Dr. Keith Melancon, director of **Georgetown's Kidney and Pancreas Transplant Surgery**, who used a procedure called **plasmapheresis** to address not only donor compatibility but racial disparity.



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60 Lives, 30 Kidneys, All Linked



FROM START TO FINISH A donation by a Good Samaritan, Rick Ruzzamenti, upper left, set in motion a 60-person chain of transplants that ended with a kidney for Donald C. Terry Jr., bottom right.


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Kidney Pancreas Liver Heart Adult Stem Cell Pediatric Stem Cell Google™ Search

Pre Transplant Post Transplant Live Donor Incompatible Program Research Educational Resources

KIDNEY INCOMPATIBLE PROGRAM



yes
 National Kidney Foundation
 National Kidney Transplant Program
 "Source: www.nkf.org, 2009-2011"

Texas Transplant Institute is a leader in offering comprehensive solutions for kidney transplant patients with incompatible live donors.. We offer the following innovative programs:

- Compatible Exchange Program**
 Another type of exchange program involves exchanging recipient/donor pairs that are "compatible," meaning they are not sensitized and have compatible blood types. Research has shown that the age of the donor kidney is a strong predictor of long term kidney function. This Kidney Paired Donor Exchange Program offers patients with older compatible kidney donors the opportunity to exchange donors with recipients that have a younger donor who is not compatible with them. An example is:

Recipient 1
30 year old female
Blood type A

Compatible

Donor 1
60 year old male (father)
Blood type O

Recipient 2
63 year old male
Blood type O

Incompatible

Donor 2
32 year old male (son)
Blood type A1

In this example, a recipient has a chance to receive a kidney from a younger donor while the other recipient with an incompatible donor is able to receive a living donor kidney transplant from a compatible donor.

- Very limited implementation of this idea.
- Limited or no incentives for compatible pairs to participate in kidney exchange.

Modeling Choice and Evolution of Kidney Exchange Pools

- The first market design paper on kidney exchange, Roth, Sönmez, & Ünver (2004), presented considerably larger potential efficiency gains from kidney exchange than we observe in practice today.
- Part of the difference is due to larger exchanges along with more elaborate list exchanges allowed in RSÜ (2004).
- However, by far the biggest factor in this difference is the prominent presence of compatible pairs in RSÜ (2004).
- Patients are assumed have strict preferences over compatible kidneys in RSÜ (2004).

As such, patients have valid reasons to participate in kidney exchange even if they have a compatible donor.

- Hence, the disparity between numbers of O patients and O donors is minimal in RSÜ (2004) as an implication of its modeling choice.

Modeling Choice and Evolution of Kidney Exchange Pools

- As a “prerequisite” of collaboration with members of New England transplantation community, we were asked to develop a model that is limited to two-way exchanges where patients are indifferent between compatible kidneys (i.e. **dichotomous** preferences).
- Doctors were worried that the strict preference assumption might lead to patients or hospitals competing over “better” kidneys, potentially hurting the system.
- This request resulted in RSÜ (2005) which became the starting point of a series of fruitful interactions between market designers and members of the transplantation community.
- **However, this alternative modeling choice also removed the primary reason of compatible pairs to participate in kidney exchange!**
- The practice of kidney exchange mostly adopted this approach based on dichotomous patient preferences, even though this assumption is in part reflection of some “transplantation politics.”

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- Higher Efficiency via Larger Kidney Exchange Programs

Amendment of the National Organ Transplant Act

- When we initially helped found New England Program for Kidney Exchange (NEPKE), it was unclear whether kidney exchange is in violation of NOTA.
- In particular, it was unclear whether kidney exchange was considered to involve transfer of a human organ for valuable consideration.
- In Dec 2007, an amendment of NOTA has passed in the Senate, clarifying that kidney exchange is legal and removing the barrier from establishment of national kidney exchange.

One Hundred Tenth Congress of the United States of America

AT THE FIRST SESSION

*Began and held at the City of Washington on Thursday,
the fourth day of January, two thousand and seven*

An Act

To amend the National Organ Transplant Act to provide that criminal penalties do not apply to human organ paired donation, and for other purposes.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Charlie W. Norwood Living Organ Donation Act".

SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL ORGAN TRANSPLANT ACT.

Section 301 of the National Organ Transplant Act (42 U.S.C. 274e) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by adding at the end the following:

"The preceding sentence does not apply with respect to human organ paired donation."; and

(2) in subsection (c), by adding at the end the following:

"(4) The term 'human organ paired donation' means the donation and receipt of human organs under the following circumstances:

"(A) An individual (referred to in this paragraph as the 'first donor') desires to make a living donation of a human organ specifically to a particular patient (referred to in this paragraph as the 'first patient'), but such donor is biologically incompatible as a donor for such patient.

"(B) A second individual (referred to in this paragraph as the 'second donor') desires to make a living donation of a human organ specifically to a second particular patient (referred to in this paragraph as the 'second patient'), but such donor is biologically incompatible as a donor for such patient.

"(C) Subject to subparagraph (D), the first donor is biologically compatible as a donor of a human organ for the second patient, and the second donor is biologically compatible as a donor of a human organ for the first patient.

"(D) If there is any additional donor-patient pair as described in subparagraph (A) or (B), each donor in the group of donor-patient pairs is biologically compatible as a donor of a human organ for a patient in such group.

"(E) All donors and patients in the group of donor-patient pairs (whether 2 pairs or more than 2 pairs) enter into a single agreement to donate and receive such human organs, respectively, according to such biological compatibility in the group.

U.S. National Kidney Paired Donation Pilot Program

- In 2010, a pilot national kidney exchange program in U.S. (UNOS-KPD) is launched.

As of December 2011, NEPKE became part of UNOS-KPD.

- However, in part because of its late establishment, activity in the UNOS-KPD is relatively modest compared to major programs.

The screenshot shows the OPTN (Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network) website. The header includes the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services logo and the OPTN logo. The main navigation bar lists: Policy Management, Members, About OPTN, Donation & Transplantation, Data, News, and Resources. The left sidebar contains a list of resources: Resources, Allocation Calculators, Calendar of Events, Kidney Paired Donation Pilot Program, Patient Resources, Professional Resources, White Papers, Links, and Glossary. The main content area is titled "resources" and "kidney paired donation pilot program". It contains a paragraph about KPD, a link to "Learn more about paired donation now", and a link to "Exit Disclaimer". Below this, there is a section titled "Program Goal" which states the goal of the KPD Pilot Program is to identify as many compatible pairs as possible and to maximize the number of matched pairs while providing additional consideration for specific populations, such as children and highly sensitized candidates. There is also a section titled "About Living Donation" which states that patients who need additional information about living donation can access many helpful resources on the Transplant Living Web site. The footer of the page includes the text "32/42".

U.S. Department of Health & Human Services

www.hhs.gov

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* Resources

* Allocation Calculators

* Calendar of Events

Kidney Paired Donation Pilot Program

* Patient Resources

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White Papers

* Links

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resources

kidney paired donation pilot program

Kidney paired donation (KPD) is a transplant option for those waiting for a kidney transplant. It is for patients who have a willing living donor who is incompatible. [Learn more about paired donation now](#). [Exit Disclaimer](#)

The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) is developing a national KPD system. [United Network for Organ Sharing \(UNOS\)](#) [Exit Disclaimer](#), as the OPTN contractor, will administer this system and it will be open to all OPTN/UNOS-approved transplant programs that perform living donor kidney transplants.

To help prepare for the final implementation, the OPTN began implementing the KPD Pilot Program in the fall of 2010. The interim program allows UNOS staff to gain experience with KPD and refine its business processes before rolling out the system nationwide.

Read about the [first kidney paired donor transplants](#) in the national pilot program.

To learn more, choose a resource below:

[Kidney Paired Donation Pilot Program Operational Guidelines](#)
Updated in 2010, the Kidney Paired Donation Pilot Program Operational Guidelines provide rules for participating in the KPD Pilot Program.

[National KPD Pilot Program Proposal](#)
This proposal, approved by the OPTN/UNOS Board of Directors in June 2008, provides information on the development of a national kidney paired donation pilot program administered by the OPTN and outlines the components of the program. To receive a full version of the proposal with exhibits, please contact kidneypaireddonation@unos.org.

Program Goal

The goal of the Kidney Paired Donation (KPD) Pilot Program is to identify as many compatible pairs as possible and to maximize the number of matched pairs while providing additional consideration for specific populations, such as children and highly sensitized candidates.

About Living Donation

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Incentivizing Compatible Pairs

- On the one hand countless blood-type O patients with non-O donors are waiting for a potential exchange, on the other hand many O blood-type donors directly donate to their non-O recipients.
- How can we incentivize participation of these compatible pairs to kidney exchange?

Some potential paths:

- Cash incentives: Currently a taboo in much of the world...
- Giving up the dichotomous preference paradigm as in RSÜ (2004) and Nicoló & Rodríguez-Álvarez (2012): More promising than cash incentives but so far restricted to a few small programs.
- In Sönmez & Ünver (2013) we propose an alternative policy that might potentially be more compatible with the current paradigm.

A New Proposal

- **Policy Proposal** (Sönmez & Ünver 2013): If an O donor with a compatible non-O patient (or if an AB patient with a compatible non-AB donor) participates in exchange, even though they do not need to, the patient is given **priority** in the deceased donor wait list in case he needs another kidney in the future due to a second failure.
 - Altruism is incentivized with an **“insurance”** for a potential future failure.
 - About 15% of kidney transplants are repeat transplants.
 - Such priority is already given to living donors!
- If adopted, this incentive scheme will give a major advantage to UNOS-KPD, since UNOS is in charge of the deceased donor wait list.

Hitting Two Birds with One Stone

- Given a fixed patient-donor pool, **patients of all groups** benefit from the above-described incentive scheme.

Theorem (Sönmez & Ünver 2013): Weakly more transplants are made within each patient group under a policy that incentivizes participation of ABO compatible pairs via increased priority in future kidney failures.

Hitting Two Birds with One Stone

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Theorem (Sönmez & Ünver 2013): Weakly more transplants are made within each patient group under a policy that incentivizes participation of ABO compatible pairs via increased priority in future kidney failures.

- Moreover, having an edge over other programs, **only the national kidney exchange program survives** under our incentive scheme.

Theorem (Sönmez & Ünver 2013): Consider the game where patient-donor pairs choose among multiple kidney exchange programs based on the expected patient “utility.” All pairs list themselves at the national exchange program that has adopted the above described incentive scheme, and thus no pair list themselves in any other program under the unique Nash equilibrium.

Potential Future of Kidney Exchange

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Tissue Type Compatibility and Kidney Exchange Pools

- In the absence of compatible pairs, the only blood-type O donors in kidney exchange pools are those with positive crossmatch with their intended patients.
- In other words, we would not see any O donors in kidney exchange pools in the absence of tissue type incompatibility!
- Thus, the only viable exchange would be between
 - blood-type A patients with B donors, and
 - blood-type B patients with A donors.
- Ironically, the presence of tissue type incompatibility considerably increases the scope of kidney exchange in the absence of compatible pairs.

ABO and HLA Desensitization Protocols

- For some patients with “moderate” antibody levels for ABO (blood-type) or HLA (tissue-type) antigens, it may be possible to reduce their level of antibodies with medication below levels that preclude transplantation.

This process is known as **desensitization** in transplantation.

- While this medical modality is expensive and inferior to donation from compatible donors, in some cases it may be the only option for some “hard to match” patient-donor groups.
- In the absence of kidney exchange, **both ABO-desensitization and HLA-desensitization increases the number of patients who can receive transplants.**

After all, that is the intention of the desensitization protocols!

Desensitization Protocols: Good or Bad?

- However, contrary to its intended purpose, HLA-desensitization is a source of **negative externality** to the general patient population in the presence of kidney exchange.

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- However, contrary to its intended purpose, HLA-desensitization is a source of **negative externality** to the general patient population in the presence of kidney exchange.
- **Theorem** (Sönmez & Ünver in preparation): While ABO-desensitization increases the number of patients who receive transplants from live donors (either directly or via exchange), **HLA-desensitization decreases** the number of patients who receive transplants from live donors in the presence of kidney exchange.

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- **Theorem** (Sönmez & Ünver in preparation): While ABO-desensitization increases the number of patients who receive transplants from live donors (either directly or via exchange), **HLA-desensitization decreases** the number of patients who receive transplants from live donors in the presence of kidney exchange.
- Just as tissue-type incompatibility increases the scope of kidney exchange by increasing the supply of much needed O donors in the pool, HLA-desensitization reduces it via the opposite effect!

Conclusion

- The share of transplants from kidney exchanges have increased dramatically over the last decade with the introduction of **organized** kidney exchange programs that embraced **optimization** techniques and certain innovations by market designers.
- However a number of factors including
 - the presence of too many small programs,
 - the disparity between blood-type distributions of donors and patients due to lack of participation of compatible pairslimit the real life benefits from kidney exchange considerably below its potential.
- While current kidney exchange programs are fairly successful in optimizing transplants within **static** kidney exchange pools, there are still considerable gains in adopting policies that will result in **more favorable patient-donors pools**.

Conclusion

- Insight from several branches of economic theory, including
 - Incentives,
 - Adverse Selection,
 - Externalities
- provide guidance on achieving such favorable patient-donor pools.